




Ethics and Society

POLI 27

Reading for Wednesday 8/18

- ▶ Thomas Hobbes - Leviathan (selections)
- ▶ Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay - The Federalist Papers (#10 and #51)
- ▶ Max Weber - The Vocation Lectures (selections)



Thomas Hobbes - Leviathan (selections)

- ▶ Published in 1651, just after the end of the English Civil War (1642-1651).
- ▶ Early example of social contract theory.
- ▶ Hobbes is typically considered a pessimist regarding human nature.
- ▶ This pessimism about what would happen in the absence of a central authority drives his reasoning about the need for government.
- ▶ For Hobbes, morality occurs only after the establishment of government.
 - ▶ Contrast Bowles and Gintis, Tomasello and Vaish

Thomas Hobbes – Leviathan (selections)

1. NATURE hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself.

2. And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general, and infallible rules, called science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained (as prudence,) while we look after somewhat else,) I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For pru-

Thomas Hobbes – *Leviathan* (selections)

dence, is but experience; which equal time, equally bestows on all
[61] men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That
which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain
conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men think they
have in a greater degree, than the vulgar; that is, than all men but
themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for concurring with
themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that
howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or
more eloquent, or more learned; yet they will hardly believe there be
many so wise as themselves; for they see their own wit at hand, and
other men's at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in
that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater
sign of the equal distribution of any thing, than that every man is
contented with his share.

Thomas Hobbes – *Leviathan* (selections)

3. From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass, that where an invader hath no more to fear, than another man's single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of another.

Thomas Hobbes – *Leviathan* (selections)

4. And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

Thomas Hobbes – *Leviathan* (selections)

6. So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.

7. The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them: the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile.

8.* Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man. For WAR, consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of *time*, is to be considered in the nature of war; as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather, lieth not in a shower or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature of war, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.

Thomas Hobbes – *Leviathan* (selections)

9. Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

Thomas Hobbes – *Leviathan* (selections)

10. It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this inference, made from the passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let him therefore consider* with himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be laws, and public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of his fellow-subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse man's nature in it. The desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions, that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them: which till laws be made they cannot know: nor can any law be made, till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it.

11. It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this;* and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so

Thomas Hobbes – *Leviathan* (selections)

12. But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another; yet in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbours; which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby, the industry of their subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the liberty of particular men.

13. To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice

Thomas Hobbes – Leviathan (selections)

are none of the faculties neither of the body, nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions. They are qualities, that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no *mine* and *thine* distinct; but only that to be every man's, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason.

14. The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature: whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two following chapters.

Thomas Hobbes – Leviathan (selections)


- ▶ Since humans are roughly equal in body and mind, if you create wealth on your own, a larger force of people can seize it from you, so just to preserve yourself, you must conquer as many others as you can, *even if you don't want to*.
- ▶ “Without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war” – the state of nature.
- ▶ In the state of nature, everyone has a right to everything, even to one another's body (to harm and kill). Nothing can be unjust, because there is no law and no common power.
- ▶ Those who seek peace are obliged to transfer to a third party (“a common power”) those rights that hinder the peace of humankind.
- ▶ There will only be peace if an absolute ruler forces it with punishment of violators.
- ▶ The ruler's power is absolute and perpetual, and one must not disobey or rebel against the ruler even if the ruler is tyrannical, because civil war is far worse.

Non est potestas Super Terram quae Comparetur ei. Iob. 41. 24.




Max Weber - The Vocation Lectures

- ▶ What is politics? What is a state?
- ▶ Maybe we should look at how states behave. What do states do? It turns out that they do lots of things, and it's hard to say which of these are its proper role.
 - ▶ What if it's the *means* available to the state that distinguish it?
- ▶ “Every state is based on force” (Trotsky).
- ▶ “Violence is, of course, not the normal or the only means available to the state. That is undeniable. **But it is the means specific to the state.**”




Max Weber - The Vocation Lectures

- ▶ “...the relationship of the state to violence is particularly close at the present time. In the past the use of physical violence by widely differing organizations-starting with the clan-was completely normal. Nowadays, in contrast, we must say that **the state is the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the *monopoly of legitimate physical violence* within a particular territory**-and this idea of "territory" is an essential defining feature.”




Max Weber - The Vocation Lectures

- ▶ “For what is specific to the present is that all other organizations or individuals can assert the right to use physical violence only insofar as the *state* permits them to do so. **The state is regarded as the sole source of the "right" to use violence.** Hence, what **"politics"** means for us is to strive for a share of **power** or to influence the distribution of power, whether between states or between the groups of people contained within a state.”




Max Weber - The Vocation Lectures

- ▶ “This corresponds in all essentials to common parlance. When we say that a question is "political," that a minister or official is “political,” or that a decision has been made on “political” grounds, we always mean...that **the interests involved in the distribution or preservation of power, or a shift in power, play a decisive role in resolving that question, or in influencing that decision or defining the sphere of activity of the official concerned. Whoever is active in politics strives for power, either power as a means in the service of other goals, whether idealistic or selfish, or power “for its own sake,” in other words, so as to enjoy the feeling of prestige that it confers.**”




Max Weber - The Vocation Lectures

- ▶ “Like the political organizations that preceded it historically, the state represents a relationship in which people *rule over* other people. This relationship is based on **the legitimate use of force** (that is to say, force that is perceived as legitimate). If the state is to survive, **those who are ruled over must always *acquiesce*** in the authority that is claimed by the rulers of the day. When do they do so and why? By what internal reasons is this rule justified, and on what external supports is it based?”




Max Weber - The Vocation Lectures

- ▶ “To start with the internal justifications: there are in principle three grounds that *legitimate* any rule.
- ▶ First, the authority of "the eternal past," of *custom*, sanctified by a validity that extends back into the mists of time and is perpetuated by habit. This is "traditional" rule, as exercised by patriarchs and patrimonial rulers of the old style.”




Max Weber - The Vocation Lectures

- ▶ Second, there is the authority of the extraordinary, personal *gift of grace or charisma*, that is, the wholly personal devotion to, and a personal trust in, the revelations, heroism, or other leadership qualities of an individual. This is "**charismatic**" rule of the kind practiced by prophets or-in the political sphere-the elected warlord or the ruler chosen by popular vote, the great demagogue, and the leaders of political parties.




Max Weber - The Vocation Lectures

- ▶ Lastly, there is **rule by virtue of "legality,"** by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal *statutes* and practical "competence" based on rational rules. This type of rule is based on a person's willingness to carry out statutory duties obediently. Rule of this kind is to be found in the modern "servant of the state" and all those agents of power who resemble him in this respect.



Max Weber – Politics as a Vocation

- ▶ “...the state is the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the *monopoly of legitimate physical violence.*”
- ▶ “...there are in principle three grounds that legitimate any rule.”
 - ▶ First, the authority of "the eternal past," of **custom**, sanctified by a validity that extends back into the mists of time and is perpetuated by habit.”
 - ▶ Second, there is the authority of the extraordinary, personal...**charisma**, personal devotion to [the] leadership qualities of an individual.
 - ▶ Lastly, there is rule by virtue of "**legality**," - belief in the validity of legal statutes and practical "competence" based on rational rules.
- ▶ “...what "politics" means for us is to **strive for a share of power** or to influence the distribution of power.”



Hamilton, Madison, Jay - The Federalist Papers

- ▶ Written during and after the debate on the American Constitution of 1787.
 - ▶ The authors support ratification.
 - ▶ Published pseudonymously.
- ▶ Authors are Hamilton, Madison, Jay
 - ▶ (this is Hamilton)
- ▶ Scholars think that #10 and #51 were probably written by Madison.
- ▶ Fundamental question: should there be a strong central government?
 - ▶ Important: Hamilton, Madison and Jay are all from large states.


Hamilton, Madison, Jay – Federalist #10

- ▶ “A factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.”
 - ▶ “By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are **united and actuated by some common impulse of passion**, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”
- ▶ “There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by **removing its causes**; the other, by **controlling its effects**.”




Hamilton, Madison, Jay – Federalist #10

- ▶ “There are **again two methods of removing the causes of faction**: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.”
 - ▶ The first remedy is worse than the disease, and the second is impracticable, because:
- ▶ “From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.”




Hamilton, Madison, Jay – Federalist #10

- ▶ “The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man...So strong is **this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities**, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, **the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions** have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts.”
 - ▶ We’ve seen this idea before. Bowles & Gintis, Haidt.
- ▶ “But the most common and durable source of factions has been the **various and unequal distribution of property.**”




Hamilton, Madison, Jay – Federalist #10

- ▶ [Drawing on John Locke] **“No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause**, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; **yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations**, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens?
- ▶ **“...the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges”**
 - ▶ compare pickup basketball



Hamilton, Madison, Jay – Federalist #10

- ▶ “It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. **Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.**”
- ▶ “The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed, and that **relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.**”
- ▶ “To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and **at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government,** is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed.”



Hamilton, Madison, Jay – Federalist #10

- ▶ “...democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have **erroneously supposed** that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.”
- ▶ “By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by **one of two only**. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression.”




Hamilton, Madison, Jay – Federalist #10

- ▶ “A **republic**, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of **representation** takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.”
- ▶ “The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, **the delegation of the government**, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the **greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country**, over which the latter may be extended.”




Hamilton, Madison, Jay – Federalist #10

- ▶ “The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to **refine and enlarge the public views**, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”
- ▶ “The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and **it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded** in the former than in the latter.”




Hamilton, Madison, Jay – Federalist #10

- ▶ “Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you **make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive** to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.”
- ▶ “Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,—is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it.”



Hamilton, Madison, Jay – Federalist #10

- ▶ “The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.”



Hamilton, Madison, Jay – Federalist #10

- ▶ “In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a **republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government**. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.”

