

Corruption as an enemy force-multiplier

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Abstract

This paper presents a theory of occupation-induced corruption as an accelerant of conflict. I present a model of territorial occupation by a foreign power that increases corrupt practices among the local population. Increased corruption in turn creates sharp divides between insiders and outsiders, and engenders significant resentment towards both the occupying power and its collaborators in the civilian government. This resentment causes militant youths to join existing rebel groups, and increased activity by these insurgents causes the security environment to deteriorate, making the occupying power more likely to extend its occupation. After outlining these theoretical propositions, I present a thorough research design for the investigation of this question, including a discussion of sampling, conceptualization, operationalization and validity. Finally, I turn to specific predictions and policy implications. **Word Count:** 5,040

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1 Introduction

The United States is approaching the twentieth anniversary of its occupation of Afghanistan. Soldiers not yet born when the occupation began are now eligible to continue it. This seems an opportune moment to reflect on the surprising permanence of security-motivated territorial occupation. This article will examine an underappreciated factor in the international security environment: the role of corruption. While the political and developmental consequences of corruption are well-known and have been sufficiently bemoaned (Rose-Ackerman 1996, Klitgaard 1998), the effect of corruption on security is not often studied. The ideas that I will develop in this paper put uncomfortable limits on the utility of

force to an occupying power. Second-order consequences of typical occupation practices are not mere epiphenomena, but play a decisive role in frustrating the occupying power's objectives. Put this way, the security consequences of corruption are subtle but significant. It may be the case that the billions that must be spent to execute an occupation undermine the political objectives for which the occupation is waged in the first place.

1.1 Preliminaries

Occupying powers face a shortage of local knowledge. They are at a significant disadvantage in negotiations with locals, who hold private information regarding prices, social norms, and means of getting things done. Occupiers thus act through agents - local fixers - who rapidly become indispensable to the occupying power. As these agents proliferate throughout the economy the potential for extracting rents increases on a vast scale. As the occupier does not know the going rate to dig a well in Kandahar, she must rely on the goodwill and probity of her agents. The power accrued by these agents also changes the host society, as the disproportionate wealth obtained by the occupier's agents reverberates through the society.

Occupiers also typically possess vastly greater resources than the occupied territory can deploy. Occupying states are usually richer, and the political objectives they seek within the occupied territories cause occupiers to deploy vast wealth in-country, inflating markets and dramatically altering the distribution of native wealth. While this largesse may cause overall wealth in the occupied territory to actually increase¹, it becomes difficult for citizens of the occupied territory to form rational expectations regarding future prices, and as a result Gini coefficients soar and the vast fortunes skimmed by the occupier's agents are paralleled by the proliferation of slums and shantytowns. In short, occupiers significantly transform the local economy, disrupting future planning and creating winners and losers on a vast scale.

Occupying powers diminish the rule of law. The shock of a change in the violence monopolist is hard enough to absorb, but occupiers are on a schedule and need to accomplish objectives without regard for legal niceties. Their extralegal maneuvers are not cloaked with ambiguity as the previous government's often were, but are presented as edicts whose terms must be obeyed. Because the security of the *occupier's* citizens is paramount, security considerations reign in the occupied territory. The political objective of

¹Afghanistan's GDP quintupled between 2002 and 2015 (Dharmavarapu 2015).

implementing the guarantees Iraqi constitution took second place to warrantless nighttime searches, and everyone knew it. Governments of occupied territories thus appear powerless - unable to protect the interests of their citizens - and complicit - only those actors prepared to compromise away their own legitimacy are invited by the occupier to form governments.

Finally, occupations produce unaccountable government. When a government's chief client is a foreign power rather than its own people, all the elections and finger ink in the world will fail to render it accountable in the eyes of its citizens. A government cannot serve its people and a foreign power at the same time. To the extent that a government is acceptable to the occupier, it will be unaccountable to its people. The supine behavior of Hong Kong's Legco is a case in point. Unaccountable governments need not placate citizens by upholding even the veneer of impartiality and probity, but are free (as South Vietnam's government once was) to become loci of patronage rackets with the occupier's tacit approval. Such untouchable corruption rankles. Surveys of former Afghan insurgents reveal that the most common reason for joining the Taliban was "the perception that the Afghan government was irredeemably corrupt" (Chayes 2015).

Security scholars tend to dismiss worries about corruption as naive and misplaced. It is indeed much easier to build a base in the Swat valley with a few discreet backhanders to the right warlord, rather than putting out a tedious public tender with open hearings and public comment. These decisions are understandable, particularly when they are made by rotating officials without responsibility for the final outcome. But the sum total of such choices influences young people's impressions of the kind of society they live in and the kind of government they have. If they conclude that their government is run in the interests of powerful thugs, and that, worse yet, an occupying power is helping the thugs retain control, there is nothing to stop them from taking to the hills and joining the insurgency. Patrick Henry would do no less. Security considerations thus indicate that occupation-induced corruption may be an enemy force-multiplier², serving to recruit and radicalize young people who might just as easily have stayed at home.

²The correct term may actually be "return to force scale" or "multiplication factor" (Hurley 2005), because additional angry young men may not constitute an actual force-multiplier for an army already composed primarily of angry young men. However, if we think of the preexisting radicals as older men, strategically ambitious but personally cautious and thus tactically restrained, the addition of angry young men might indeed be a force-multiplier in the technical sense.

1.2 A Theory of Occupation-Induced Corruption

The foregoing points can be distilled to the following hypotheses:

1. Occupying powers tend to increase corruption levels in the occupied territory.
2. Increased corruption fuels insurgencies.
3. Insurgencies cause deterioration in the security environment.
4. Deterioration of the security environment induces the occupying power to extend its occupation.
5. Extension of the occupation results in a further increase in corruption.

The conditions bringing about the occupation itself (and its termination) are beyond the scope of this model, but the cycle seems to end only when the occupied society develops its own (internal) anticorruption norms. This process can take a generation or longer. Examples from the universe of historical cases might include the perpetuation of long-running insurgencies in the Spanish Netherlands, in Vichy France, and in Soviet Afghanistan.

<i>Country</i>	<i>CPI</i>
Burundi	17
Libya	17
Afghanistan	16
Equatorial Guinea	16
Guinea Bissau	16
Sudan	16
Korea, North	14
Yemen	14
South Sudan	13
Syria	13
Somalia	10

Table 1: Lowest-ranked states on the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index

It is striking how many of the poorest performers on Transparency International's Corruption Per-

ceptions Index (CPI) have recently had territory occupied by a foreign power.³ However, it will not be enough to show that corruption is a consequence of occupation. I seek to show that corruption is itself responsible for the radicalization of insurgents, the deterioration of the security environment, and the prolongation of the occupation. This is a heavy burden, and requires attention to indirect, second-order effects. In occupied territories the occupier has no political incentive to pay any of the costs of negative externalities, which are borne directly by the occupied population. As a result, policies have substantial effects that reverberate beyond their immediate objectives. In addition, occupiers face a time-consistency problem. No matter their assurances that they will remain in-country and continue to monopolize violence, occupiers cannot credibly commit to such an indefinite extension of their presence. I will argue that unless policymakers plan for and internalize the externalities imposed by occupation, inefficient equilibria result where a small group of native insiders prosper at the expense of a larger group of outsiders without credentials, access or power. These are the seeds of violent revolution.

2 Research Design

In this section I will present a research design aimed at evaluating the five hypotheses given in section 1.2. Throughout, I will make reference to this background question: does occupation-induced corruption cause or deepen conflict? We thus have a cause construct, corruption, and an effect construct, conflict. The general strategy I propose is one of mixed analysis, with both qualitative and quantitative components. The paucity of contemporary occupations combined with the severe limitations of historical quantitative data render a mixed approach appropriate for an initial exploratory endeavor like the project envisioned here. Data will be observational (non-experimental) and unobtrusive, avoiding Hawthorne effects.

It is tempting to see occupation by foreign powers as a sort of natural experiment, where some quasi-random process is assigning states to treatment. However, no two states are perfectly similar prior to occupation, rendering this approach questionable. An instrumental variables approach holds more promise, but is beyond my scope here. I will now present approaches to sampling, conceptualization, operationalization and validity.

³The shortcomings of Transparency International's corruption measure have been well-documented, and a full research program in this area will have to look to alternative measures of corruption, such as business surveys, capital outflows and criminal convictions.

2.1 Sampling

To reduce the possibility of systematic error, this study will employ a dataset of prominent corruption indices for all countries. Each country-year will be coded with a dummy for "occupied", which I will operationalize below. To an extent this will result in convenience sampling, as data are available for Europe in far greater historical detail. However, I will attempt to use multiple imputation techniques (EM algorithm) to estimate values for missing data, allowing us to select from a global sampling frame. The sample considered for analysis will be the dataset as a whole. The small sample size will limit the study's power, and establishing causal inference will consequently be difficult. These problems are familiar to scholars of international relations. Rare-event analysis can be complicated by reliance on logit coefficients, which are known to be biased in small samples ($n < 200$) (King and Zeng 2001).

2.2 Conceptualization

The background concept of corruption can be systematized in a number of ways. I will use the World Bank's definition of corruption, "the abuse of public office for private gain" (World Bank 2019). Official corruption takes place at the interface of the public and private sectors, and involves the use of group resources to achieve individual purposes. To accommodate this larger conception, other researchers have operationalized corruption as "the abuse of trusted authority for private gain". This broader definition is more difficult to operationalize, and I have instead focused on the abuses of officeholders. As a systematized concept, abuse of public office for private gain is more easily operationalized.

Other variables of interest are easier to conceptualize. There is substantial academic work on insurgent recruitment (Jones 2008), tracking violent incidents (Piazza and Choi 2018), and establishing social outcomes (Bertelsmann 2018). Territorial occupation can be conceptualized as temporary territorial changes (v6 in the Correlates of War dataset).

2.3 Operationalization

Measuring corruption has proved very difficult. After all, both parties to the transaction usually have an interest in keeping it secret, and public officials necessarily have at least some discretion over their budgets. As a proxy for measuring actual corruption, researchers have measured perceived corruption, on the theory that public perceptions will in general track actual corruption, particularly over time. Trans-

parency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is among the most widely cited corruption indices, but there are many others. Researchers have observed significant correlation of three different anticorruption indicators with each other (convergent validity), improving confidence in their validity (one was of informal economic activity, one of excessive regulation, and one of corruption perceptions) (Willhelm 2002, Azfar et al. 2001). While these are still not a measurement of actual corruption, my confidence in this operationalization is bolstered by the correlation in the indices.

Other concepts, like insurgent recruitment and the security environment, are easily proxied by official data released by the United States Department of Defense (DoD 2018) and made available by private analysts (ACLED 2019) and academic organizations (University of Maryland 2019). For a state to count as occupied, I will stipulate that 51 percent or more of its territory must be controlled by another state for more than 180 days in that calendar year.

2.4 Case Study Component

To guide future research in this area, it will be important to conduct case studies to shed light on a larger class of cases of occupation-induced corruption (Gerring 2004). While this of course rules out causal inference because we will be selecting on the dependent variable, my goal here is something other than scientific generalization - I wish to provide disciplined intuitions that can be foundational for later research. In this case study component I will sample purposively, selecting approximately ten cases featuring long-term occupations. I will look for theoretically deviant cases featuring influential configurations of the independent variables, and use them to discipline the hypotheses given above, further developing the theory section of this research design and using it to generate testable research predictions. This will mean looking for inflationary, high-handed occupations that generated corruption but did not fuel an insurgency, as well as moderate and well-conducted occupations which did not generate significant corruption but nevertheless incited an insurgency. Finally, I will attempt to employ elements of a most-similar design, where I find cases similar on nearly all components except the variables of interest.⁴

⁴See Davis 2015 for an interesting comparison of the effects of US involvement in Colombia and Afghanistan.

2.5 Construct Validity

Validity consists of the best available approximation to the truth of a given proposition, inference or conclusion. Construct validity is the degree to which inferences can legitimately be made from the operationalizations in the present study to the theoretical constructs on which those operationalizations are based (Trochim and Donnelly 2007). In short, the operationalization must adequately capture the construct. I take a relationalist approach to construct validity, allowing for topic continuity across time.

Correlational research of this type is lower in internal validity and has difficulty demonstrating causation. However, the difficulties of an experimental approach seem insurmountable. Adequate preoperational explication of the constructs will also involve concept mapping, though this is beyond the scope of the present article. We will wish to avoid mono-operation and mono-method bias by using several operationalizations of the independent variable, which in our analysis will mean multiple measures of corruption, insurgent recruitment, conflict events and social capital.

Translation validity is a concern in this research design, because although my operationalizations of corruption pass a face validity test, it is virtually impossible to evaluate their content validity, because we cannot be sure that the operationalization is not capturing some extra element that we have not accounted for in the model. As we saw above, corruption measures exhibit strong concurrent validity but we cannot evaluate convergent validity without reference to an as-yet undiscovered gold standard in corruption measurement.

We also have reasons to expect systematic error in corruption measures. While random error (noise) does not bias results, systematic error shifts the mean of the distribution, introducing bias. Corruption perceptions seem likely to radically undercount actual corruption, because so much corruption is discreet and unnoticed. However, in traditional societies the proceeds of corruption become visible very quickly, so there is perhaps a compensatory effect in the opposite direction.

As adverted to above, establishing internal validity is difficult in observational studies like this one, but we can bolster internal validity by arranging our study so that countervailing explanations are isolated experimentally. The case study component of this research design will allow us to reject particular types of causation by design. External validity is likewise limited by the low power of this research, so we will not be able to generalize freely from these conclusions. However, since occupation-induced corruption is itself a rare event, future research will depend on the construction of broad-based historical datasets




Figure 1: CPI in Afghanistan, 2003 - 2018

extending our knowledge beyond the past century.

3 Discussion

3.1 H1: The effect of occupation on corruption levels

I predict that the mere presence of occupying powers will tend to increase corruption levels in the occupied territory. If this prediction is correct, we should see disproportionate downward shifts in CPI resulting from territorial occupation. This research question has been addressed tangentially in the literature. In Afghanistan (McGinley 2012, Burke 2013), Iraq (Dodge 2013), Palestine (Mohamad 2007), Ukraine (Klymenko 2016) and Colombia (Davis 2015), occupation has been found to contribute to corruption, though as one among a network of other factors. At the crudest level of measurement, we could examine whether occupied states have steeper falls in the CPI than would be expected in similarly-situated non-occupied states. Examination of Afghanistan’s CPI trajectory is suggestive (Figure 1). While the country saw a substantial increase in perceived corruption over the decade subsequent to the invasion in 2001, a recent sustained reduction in corruption perceptions suggests a complication that may be explained by coalescing local anticorruption norms. If occupiers increase corruption, we should also expect to see declining levels of social capital and public trust (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005).

3.2 H2: The effect of increased corruption levels on insurgent recruitment

I predict that increased corruption will fuel insurgencies by recruiting disaffected outsiders who have lost faith in irredeemably corrupt governments. If this prediction is correct, we should expect to see a positive correlation between corruption and insurgent recruitment, proxied by analysts' estimates of insurgent numbers and the few metadata available (social network affiliations, acres under cultivation, etc.). This relationship has not to my knowledge been studied in the international relations literature, but studies in Afghanistan (NATO 2018, Wilson Center 2016) and India (Carnegie 2016) broadly confirm the conclusions of the few large-scale studies of corruption and insurgent recruitment (RAND 2017, Perry and Gordon 2008) - that frustration with government corruption is the principal source of growth in insurgent movements. If corruption is a principal motive for recruitment, we should see recruitment fall after new governments are elected, and we should also see recruitment rise in the wake of prominent press coverage of corruption. We can also expect that recruits will be disproportionately drawn from politically active, middle class families who would have most to gain from probity in government.

3.3 H3: The effect of insurgent recruitment on the security environment

I predict that insurgencies cause deterioration of the security environment. It does not seem controversial to suggest that more insurgents means more conflict. It also seems relatively easy to measure whether insurgent recruitment and conflict events are associated. Several investigations (DoD 2012, Reno and Matisek 2018) confirm that as insurgent groups become able to recruit more fighters, their ability to project power and the number of conflict incidents both increase.

It may also be possible to test the effect of increased corruption directly on the security environment. Violent attacks in Afghanistan are tracked in detail, and it should be straightforward to estimate their association with corruption levels. Unfortunately, disaggregated corruption data by Afghan province are suppressed by the Pentagon (Politico 2013), but it should be possible to compare a heat map of corruption convictions with a heat map of insurgent attacks and plot spatial correlation. Examining this type of data within particular states allows us to largely factor out the cross-cultural differences that complicate inter-state analyses, with the result that we may be able to isolate the causal power of corruption from confounding factors.

3.4 H4: The effect of deteriorating security on occupiers' choices

I predict that deterioration of the security environment will often frustrate the objectives of the occupying power, forcing it to extend its occupation. This will depend on the purposes for which the occupation was initiated. I am inclined to limit my universe of cases to those occupations which resulted from the occupying power's security concerns, because for this hypothesis occupiers' choices constitute the independent variable. Occupations can result from a variety of international interactions, and while these all may incite corruption in the occupied state, the occupier will only feel compelled to extend its occupation if the occupation was initially security-motivated. I have in mind paradigmatic cases of occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan, but a surprising amount of historical territorial expansion was (at least ostensibly) security-motivated, including initial Roman expansion outside Italy and French expansion in the post-revolutionary period. The point is that if an occupier enters the country to quell a security threat, they are likely to stay until the threat is quelled. If their very presence enhances the security threat over time, the occupation is likely to take on a permanent character.

3.5 H5: The effect of prolonged occupation on social capital, trust and corruption

I predict that extended occupation will further entrench corruption and continue to bolster insurgent recruitment. Such entrenched corruption has profound and well-documented social effects, such as diminished capital and reduced social trust. In the same way that a public school system and a highway network provide some of the enabling conditions for modern life, contemporary economies are supported by unseen networks of trust and cooperation that are radically impaired by corruption. The benefits of markets can only be achieved if they are supported by appropriately functioning institutions, and those institutions depend on the active, willing participation of citizens to work properly. Corruption can cause institutions to fail at their mediating role (Azfar, Lee and Swamy 2001). For instance, while in most places education correlates positively with trust in institutions, in corrupt societies the pattern reverses and more education only results in less institutional trust (Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012). The statistical correlation between past experience of totalitarian government and present-day corruption is a reminder that these effects are generational and difficult to change.

These are some of the "comparative politics" consequences of widespread corruption, and as I men-

tioned, they have been sufficiently noted (and bemoaned) in the literature. I mention these effects here only to note their impact on the security environment. In a society where trust is in retreat economic growth becomes very unlikely. Zero-sum logic takes over from growth-oriented cooperation, and the very things the occupier wants the occupied society to deliver - peace, stability and prosperity - become more difficult. If the theory I have presented here is correct, longer occupations should lead to chronic, difficult-to-treat cases of systemic corruption and social malaise, which should in turn serve as the best possible recruiting campaign for insurgent groups.

3.6 Policy Implications

The implications of this analysis for occupying powers are sobering. Because of the necessity of acting through agents and inflating markets, every action by the occupier will send secondary effects cascading through the economy and society. Occupiers are in the uncomfortable position of a principal with no legal recourse in cases of betrayal by the agent. Occupying powers thus have ownership without control.

An implication of the foregoing analysis is that occupations should be short, self-contained and focused on particular objectives. They should be short because long-term occupation, as we have seen, is socially corrosive and results in increased insurgent recruitment. They should be self-contained in the sense of avoiding inflationary effects on local markets - this is very difficult to accomplish, but vital to avoid social destabilization in the occupied territory. Finally, a focus on particular security objectives makes an occupation more likely to end before its corruption-inducing effects have become manifest in the occupied society.

This dose of humility will be uncomfortable, particularly for American policymakers with the capability to turn any territory on Earth into a smoking ruin. However, the frustration of American national security objectives by second-order effects like corruption is at last beginning to be widely understood within the defense establishment. In a report to a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, General John R. Allen was emphatic about the risks. "The great challenge to Afghanistan's future isn't the Taliban, or the Pakistani safe havens or even an incipiently hostile Pakistan. The existential threat to the long-term viability of modern Afghanistan is corruption. The ideological insurgency, the criminal patronage networks, and the drug enterprise have formed an unholy alliance, which relies for its success on the criminal capture of government functions at all levels." The special inspector general for Afghan reconstruction

(SIGAR) echoed these thoughts, arguing that ignoring corruption to focus on security concerns ultimately undermined those very security considerations - he went so far as to say that “corruption is more serious in Afghanistan than the insurgency.” In a revealing anecdote, the inspector general described the atmosphere of paranoia inside Afghanistan’s anti-graft unit, as high-ranking suspects identified by the unit would repeatedly be released on government orders. Journalists describe similar operations against elements of the Karzai network being shut down on direct orders from the CIA (Chayes 2015). In the pursuit of first-order objectives, security officials must not lose sight of second-order consequences, particularly when those consequences can themselves dominate first-order objectives.

4 Conclusion

This paper presented a theory of occupation-induced corruption as an accelerant of conflict. I presented a model of territorial occupation by a foreign power which increases corrupt practices among the local population. Increased corruption in turn creates sharp divides between insiders and outsiders, and engenders significant resentment towards both the occupying power and its collaborators in the civilian government. This resentment causes militant youths to join existing rebel groups, and increased activity by these insurgents causes the security environment to deteriorate, making the occupying power more likely to extend its occupation. After outlining these theoretical propositions, I presented a thorough research design for the investigation of this question, including a discussion of sampling, conceptualization, operationalization and validity. Finally, I gave specific predictions and policy implications resulting from these hypotheses. Future empirical work will evaluate these hypotheses and consider how a larger quantitative study of corruption as an accelerant of conflict might be organized.

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