

The Implications of Symbolic Power for Social Scientific Practice

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Pierre Bourdieu understood symbolic power to be the power to secure unconscious recognition of power (1990:130) by imposing principles of division, knowledge and recognition on others (1997:189). It differs from power as such (economic, social, etc.) by requiring the consent of those upon whom it is exerted.¹ To properly elucidate the functioning of symbolic power, it is necessary to first consider Bourdieu's understanding of symbolic capital and structure. Next, we will need to evaluate Bourdieu's claim that a proper understanding of symbolic power allows us to transcend the subjective-objective distinction at the heart of social science. Finally, I will examine Bourdieu's extraordinary assertion that symbolic power and the social epistemology arising from it are fundamental to political theory (1997:173). En route, I will explain why symbolic struggles are an essential part of class society, as well as the reasons we should expect these struggles over symbolic power to result in perpetual conflict.

Bourdieu's concept of symbolic capital is analogous to Weber's 'charisma' or Durkheim's 'mana' – a transmuted form of hard power. Symbolic violence transfigures relations of

¹“Symbolic power is exerted only with the collaboration of those who undergo it because they help to construct it as such” (1997:171).

domination and submission into affective relations, transmuting power into charisma.² This results in a “capital of recognition,” permitting its holder to exert changes in the symbolic system (1998:102). In effect, symbolic capital arises when an ordinary property of one social agent is perceived by other agents and thereby becomes a symbolically effective property that, because it responds to socially constituted collective expectations and beliefs, is capable of exerting action at a distance “like a veritable magic power” (1998:102). But the scope of this transmutation is not unlimited. For the symbolic act to exert this sort of magical effect, it is necessary for “prior work – often invisible” to have produced among those who submit to the act of imposition “the dispositions necessary for them to feel they have obeyed without even posing the question of obedience.”³ Symbolic violence is thus “the violence which extorts submission which is not perceived as such” (1998:103).⁴

By contrast, Bourdieu’s concept of structure is idiosyncratic and revisionist. He calls himself a practitioner of “constructivist structuralism,” but takes great pains to distinguish this from structuralism as practiced by Sussure and Lévi-Strauss (and, one would assume, Derrida and Foucault, at least the Foucault of *Les mots et les choses*). He understands structuralism to mean the real existence of objective structures independent of the consciousness and will of agents, capable of guiding and constraining their practices. By constructivism,

²“The charismatic leader manages to be for the group what he is for himself, instead of being for himself, like those dominated in the symbolic struggle, what he is for others. He ‘makes’ the opinion which makes him; he constitutes himself as an absolute by a manipulation of symbolic power which is constitutive of his power since it enables him to produce and impose his own objectification” (1984:208).

³I think that on reflection Bourdieu would prefer not to have said that the dominated “feel they have obeyed” here, but rather that they feel that compliance is simply right, or what they would have done in any case.

⁴“The classificatory system as a principle of logical and political division only exists and functions because it reproduces, in a transfigured form...the generally gradual and continuous differences which structure the established order; but it makes its own, that is, specifically symbolic, contribution to the maintenance of that order only because it has the specifically symbolic power to make people see and believe which is given by the imposition of mental structures.” (1984:480).

he means that schemes of perceptions, thought and action (*habitus*) and social structures and classes (*fields*) are socially determined (1989:14). He is thus positing what might seem a contradiction – that the structures that take on objective force in guiding behavior are nevertheless socially determined.⁵

Drawing on these concepts, Bourdieu understands symbolic power to be a “power to construct reality,” or the power to establish a “gnoseological order⁶” (1977:114).⁷ Calling it a “subordinate” form of power mediated through symbolic systems, he argues that this process has heretofore been misunderstood, resulting in a fruitless debate between idealists and structuralists. He argues that “the theoretical achievements of social science as a whole... must be integrated (and transcended) in order to produce an adequate theory of symbolic power” (1977:112). He argues that while one school, associated with Kant, Humboldt and Cassirer, understands symbolic systems as the symbolic forms by which we construct reality⁸ and defines objectivity as “the agreement of subjectivities” (*consensus*), another school, associated with Sussure and Lévi-Strauss⁹, understands reality to be a “structured structure” and language to be a structured medium. Calling the first group “idealists” and the second group “structuralists,” Bourdieu distinguishes both sets of claims from a tradition of Marx-

⁵A subjective phenomenon with objective force (1984:484) is typically called a social norm. Bourdieu never mentions this concept in any of his writing, but there exists substantial scholarship on social norms across the social sciences, particularly in cognitive science. Notable scholars include Robert Cialdini, Dan Sperber, and Christina Bicchieri. They do not appear to cite Bourdieu. It seems almost incredible that these literatures could not be in contact, but if they are not, it is long past time for a fruitful mutual reconnaissance.

⁶It is unclear whether Bourdieu means to distinguish agnoseological order from an epistemological order. The etymology indicates identity, but Kant maintained a distinction (c.f. *intellectus ectypus*).

⁷“What is at stake in the struggles about the meaning of the social world is power over the classificatory schemes and systems which are the basis of the representations of the groups and therefore of their mobilization and demobilization” (1984:479).

⁸See Panofsky, *Perspective as Symbolic Form* (1927).

⁹Though Bourdieu is elsewhere explicit that Durkheim understood the irreducibility of symbolism to mere communication (1977:114), thus acknowledging its inescapably political aspect).

ist functionalism which interprets ideologies as purely in the service of sectional interests (1977:114).

Ultimately, Bourdieu dissents from all three interpretations, offering his own synthesis and proposing to “transcend the forced choice between . . . models which describe social relations in power relations and . . . models which see them as relations of communication” (1977:117). He identifies a widely-shared “symbolist fallacy” of reducing power relations to relations of communication, and proposes instead that symbolic systems are both structuring and structured instruments of communication and knowledge, and that this dual status allows them to serve simultaneously as mechanisms for legitimating domination (1977:115). Arguing that different classes and class fractions are perpetually engaged in a specifically symbolic struggle to impose “the definition of the social world most in conformity with their interests,” Bourdieu suggests that the field of ideological positions reproduces (in a transfigured form) the field of social positions. This symbolic struggle occurs on two levels simultaneously – directly, at the level of the “symbolic conflicts of everyday life,” and indirectly through “the struggle waged by the “specialists in symbolic production” where the object at stake is “the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence . . . the power to impose (and even indeed to inculcate) instruments of knowledge and expression of social reality (taxonomies) which are arbitrary but unrecognized as such” (1977:115).

These ideological specialists make ideas explicit and systematize them, achieving the conversion of practical mastery to symbolic mastery, which permits them to “transform the unsayable into the sayable and to transgress the bounds of the unthinkable” (1977: note 10). The field of symbolic production is thus a microcosm of the struggle between the classes: specialists in symbolic production compete with one another and attempt to serve their own

interests in the struggle internal to their particular field of production, but by so doing they perform the alchemy of making the unthinkable thinkable and thereby serve the interests of classes or class fractions external to their field. The dominant class is thus the locus of a struggle for the “hierarchy of principles of hierarchization”.¹⁰ One of the things at stake in this struggle between classes is the exchange rate for conversion (reconversion) of different types of capital, and this exchange rate is particularly implicated in the struggle over the dominant principle of domination¹¹ (1984:125).

Bourdieu expected that the struggle for distinction would constantly be moving into new areas, as the dominant class will reliably seek to discredit the values recognized by the dominated fraction of the dominant class (intellectuals) and the petty bourgeoisie, driving them into new fields (1984:78,93).¹² The struggle will also be perpetuated by the constant devaluation of credentials resulting from horizontal transfer into prestigious fields (1984:134).¹³ Despite its perpetual nature, symbolic structure need not be destabilizing. On the contrary, Bourdieu argues that because structures of perception and appreciation fundamentally incorporate objective structures that are themselves fairly stable, the struggle for the distribution of symbolic capital will likewise be stable (1998:104).¹⁴

¹⁰Bourdieu credits Weber with moves in this direction, specifically his focus on the “producers of the religious message” and the specific (positional) interests motivating them (1998:57).

¹¹Whether the dominant principle of domination will be economic, cultural or social. Much of this discussion (see pp. 124-5 et infra) recalls Walzer 1983.

¹²“Thus, what is nowadays called the ‘counter-culture’ may well be the product of the endeavour of new-style autodidacts to free themselves from the constraints of the scholastic market. They strive to do so by producing another market, with its own consecrating agencies, that is, like the high-society or intellectual markets, capable of challenging the pretension of the educational system to impose the principles of evaluation of competences and manners which reign in the scholastic market, or at least its most ‘scholastic’ sectors, on a perfectly unified market in cultural goods” (1984:96).

¹³This horizontal movement can be slowed or blocked by the establishment of a numerus clausus, a sort of exclusionary device resembling the Venetian Serrata or a modern bar association.

¹⁴I am inclined to press Bourdieu on this point. There is no logical reason why an index of stable categories cannot itself be unstable.

Despite this perpetual conflict in conditions, Bourdieu expected long-term stability of social positions.¹⁵ He argued that the faculty of taste, by encoding existing power relations as symbolic power, will confine a ‘taste’ for politics to those with a hope of exerting political impact (1984:398,470).¹⁶ He also thought that the natural human tendency to generate concepts by dichotomizing would produce an endless supply of in-groups and out-groups (1984:479). Arguing that we employ distinctions for the purposes of entrenching monopoly positions and attaching out-group markers to others, Bourdieu observes that this collective representation also frequently leads to unintended consequences, making for further natural variation in conditions (1984:480). What is more, because “the order of words never exactly reproduces the order of things, space exists for “symbolic strategies” aimed at exploiting the discrepancies between the nominal and the real and (sometimes) achieving actual social transition (1984:481).¹⁷

As a result of their centrality to the struggle for symbolic domination, Bourdieu argues that instruments of communication and knowledge are ultimately only coherent when viewed from the perspective of power (ruling out, *inter alia*, semiotics), but that they are also

¹⁵ “permanence can be ensured by change and... structure perpetuated by movement... the imposition of legitimate needs and access to the means of satisfying them, do not [contra Marx] necessarily threaten the survival of the system... the structural gap and the corresponding frustrations are the very source of the reproduction through displacement which perpetuates the structure of positions while transforming the ‘nature’ of conditions” (1984:165).

¹⁶ “[T]he antinomy between democratic spontaneism, which grants everyone the right and duty to have an opinion, regardless of sex and class, and technocratic aristocracy, which restricts opinion to ‘experts’ elected for their ‘intelligence’ and ‘competence’, finds a practical solution in the mechanisms [of taste] which induce the ‘free’ self-exclusion of those whom technocratic selection would exclude in any case... ‘Interest’ or ‘indifference’ towards politics would be better understood if it were seen that the propensity to use a political power is commensurate with the reality of this power, or, in other words, that indifference is only a manifestation of impotence” (1984:406).

¹⁷ Bourdieu’s discussion of stability recalls Machiavelli’s concept of stability despite (indeed because of) constant political flux (Discourses I.vi), as well as Madison’s argument that the balance of forces in society would be a source of political stability (Federalist 10, 51). Elsewhere, I have referred to this concept as “dynamic equilibrium.” All three systems allow us to dispense with troublesome concepts like “the general will”.

doubly determined, containing both an element of social resonance with some class or class fraction *and* some quantum of individual initiative on the part of the ideological innovator (1977:116). Structuralists erred by attempting to understand them on the basis of their own logic, but Marxists missed the vital importance of the competition for prestige among ideological innovators (and thus committed “crude reduction”). Bourdieu suggests that his interpretation allows us to avoid the Marxist reduction without “succumbing to the idealist illusion” that ideological productions can be understood as self-sufficient wholes. Indeed, on Bourdieu’s reading the very “natural attitude” (primary experience of the world of common sense) noted by phenomenologists is “a politically produced relation,” as are the categories of perception that sustain it (1998:56). Interestingly, because the field of ideological production is homologous with other fields, the struggle for prestige within the autonomous field of ideological production “automatically produces euphemized forms of the ideological class struggles” and the internal systems of classification “reproduce in a misrecognizable form taxonomies which are directly political” (1977:117).

Symbolic power is thus the power to “constitute the given by stating it, to create appearances and belief, to confirm or transform the vision of the world and thereby action in the world”. However, this power is entirely dependent on belief in the legitimacy of the words and the speaker. Symbolic power “does not reside in ‘symbolic systems’ in the form of an ‘illocutionary force’, but... is defined in and by a determinate relationship between those who exercise this power and those who undergo it” (1977:117). Misrecognition (*allodoxia*) plays a large role, because if ideological productions were recognized as mere power relations, they would be immediately rejected (1984:165), but the products of power refracted through the field of ideological production are not recognized as power relations

as such (1977:118, 1984:142). Creation of symbolic capital requires that the field itself be misrecognized (1990:68). Indeed, Bourdieu goes so far as to say that “primary cognition is misrecognition, recognition of an order which is also [only?] established in the mind” (1984:172). Ultimately, symbolic power is a transfigured form of other kinds of power, and because it emerges from them, the symbolic relations of power “tend to reproduce and to reinforce the power relations that constitute the structure of social space” (1989:21). In other words, objective relations of power tend to reproduce themselves in relations of symbolic power. This is why the power to stipulate meaning is not unlimited – a symbolic order can only impose relations that are objectively in agreement with the objective structures of the social world (1998:55). Bourdieu argues that a better understanding of the process of “transmutation of different kinds of capital into symbolic capital” ought to be the goal of any science of practice.

Bourdieu identifies a tension in social science between treating social facts objectively and subjectively, as things and as representations (1989:15). Linking the objective position to Durkheim and Mauss, and the subjective position to Schutz, Bourdieu points out that scientific knowledge is “objective” in the former sense but merely a “construct of constructs” in the latter. Arguing that these movements stand in a dialectical relationship to one another, Bourdieu draws the classically Hegelian conclusion that they can be transcended by means of a synthesis. Identifying social reality not by reference to objects but to relations (“interactions... mask the structures that are realized in them”), he states that this relational approach undergirds the argument in *La distinction* (1989:16). Briefly, individuals are situated in social space according to the overall volume of capital they possess (first dimension) and according to the structure of their capital, (second dimension), which is given

by the relative weight of its economic, social and cultural components (1986:244). Symbolic capital, as we have seen, is capital that is “apprehended symbolically,” which means that it exists in a relationship of misrecognition and recognition (see below), presupposing the intervention of the habitus (1986: note 3).¹⁸

For these reasons, Bourdieu argues that social science must take both reality and perception as its object. The objectivist desire to discover the ultimate determinants of practice is justified, but “it must not lead one to forget that the official definition of reality is part of a full definition of social reality, and that this imaginary anthropology has very real effects” (1990:108). Scientific theories are part of social reality and can (as in the case of Marx) exert a “truly real power of construction”. Ultimately, he believes in a kind of social construction of reality that occurs within structural limits, but that the structuring structures are themselves socially generated (1989:18). Thus, we are faced with a kind of “double structuring” , where the social world is structured both objectively, in the sense of strong associational regularities, and subjectively, in the sense that schemes of perception and appreciation express the state of relations of symbolic power (1989:20). Collectively, these mechanisms produce a common social world, though this common world features a great deal of indeterminacy and vagueness, yielding “semantic elasticity”. This elasticity provides the scope for symbolic struggle over meaning, and the schemata of classification constituting social reality are “the stake par excellence” of political struggle, which is “a struggle to impose the legitimate principle[s] of vision and division” (1989:21).¹⁹

¹⁸Because the social conditions of its transmission are more disguised and indirect than those of economic capital, social capital is more likely to be converted into symbolic capital than its economic counterpart (1986:245).

¹⁹Intriguingly, Bourdieu asserts that this process is most dynamic in the United States because “the indeterminacy and objective uncertainty of relations between practices and positions is at a maximum” (1989:20).

Continued struggle is virtually guaranteed because in any society there will always be “conflicts between symbolic powers that aim at imposing the vision of legitimate divisions, that is, at constructing groups” (1989:22). In this sense, symbolic power is a power of “world-making”.²⁰ The power to construct groups is the “form par excellence” of symbolic power,²¹ and requires that the symbolic power be based on the possession of symbolic capital (the accumulated social authority acquired in previous struggles) *and* that the proposed vision be founded on the objective affinities between the agents who will be brought together – actual facts about the world.²² In this sense, symbolic power is a power of “consecration” or “revelation” – the power to reveal what is already present but unappreciated.

As a result, symbolic power is “political power par excellence”²³ (1989:23). Indeed, Bourdieu thinks that symbolic power is the ultimate basis of a state’s legitimacy. He dissents from Weber’s understanding of legitimacy as a conscious choice and instead locates it in “the immediate, prereflexive agreement between objective structures and embodied structures” (1998:56).²⁴ The state need not give orders or exercise physical coercion to produce an ordered social world, as long as it is capable of producing embodied cognitive structures that accord with objective structures. Bourdieu’s conception of the state seems rather undertheorized (for instance, he calls it a “referee” (1989:15), but it is simultaneously “one of the major stakes” in the struggle for symbolic power (1997:186)), and indeed his system seems

²⁰See Goodman 1978.

²¹Bourdieu’s use of the “par excellence” formulation is somewhat excessive.

²²This is a sobering conclusion for activism – Bourdieu is arguing that “the power of constitution, a power to make a new group, through mobilization or to make it exist by proxy, by speaking on its behalf as an authorized spokesperson, can be obtained only as the outcome of a long process of institutionalization” (1989:23, my italics).

²³See note 21.

²⁴“the effect of the hierarchies of legitimacy can be described as a particular case of the ‘labelling’ effect well known to social psychologists” (1984:86). Compare Goffman 1974.

to operate without any need for an organized force with a monopoly on physical violence, because the dominant class fractions already have a monopoly on symbolic violence (see 1998:58). The theory of symbolic power would thus appear to obviate the need for a state. This is clearly too neat, but we might salvage the theory by proposing that the inevitable slack in the system of symbolic power results in underdetermination of meaning and allows for disputes to arise despite consensus on fundamentals (for instance, both robber and robbed tend to approve of the system of private property), thus motivating a state to handle the disputes that arise as a result of uncertainty (by definition, a state would not be able to handle disputes arising from attempts to change symbolic meaning).

Bourdieu's work is characterized by a sort of methodological monism. He is reluctant to discuss individuals without considering their immediate contexts, relationships and trajectories, which leads him to repeatedly argue that, essentially, everything is connected to everything else (1984:103, 107, 126, 464).²⁵ The discussion of symbolic power thus defies operationalization considerations, and must leave any social scientist at a loss as to how to measure such power in action. In addition, Bourdieu is powerfully critical of the concept of political opinion, and argues that by accepting the premise that political actions are always considered acts of judgment, we are unable to even ask the most fundamental political questions.²⁶ Instead, he identifies two other modes by which political 'opinions' are produced – class ethos and party bias (1984:418).²⁷ This leads him to vituperatively criticize “the

²⁵ “The structural causality of a network of factors is quite irreducible to the cumulated effects of the set of linear relations, of different explanatory force, which the necessities of analysis oblige one to isolate, those which are established between the different factors, taken one by one, and the practice in question; through each of the factors is exerted the efficacy of all the others, and the multiplicity of determinations leads not to indeterminacy but to over-determination” (1984:107).

²⁶ “The most fundamental political problem, the question of the modes of production of the answer to a political question, is completely masked when one accepts the intellectualist premise that every answer to a political question is the product of an act of political judgement” (1984:418).

²⁷ “The populist inclination to credit the working classes with a ‘politics’, spontaneously and naturally

logocentrism of the ‘politico-scientific’ survey which, in its methodological innocence, performs a sort of in vitro replication of the most fundamental effect of the division of political labour.”²⁸ He argues that this logocentrism and intellectualism have “prevented us from seeing that, as Leibniz put it, ‘we are automatons in three-quarters of what we do’” (1984:474). The implications for the theory of rational choice seem dire.

While the implications of all this theoretical reflection for social science methodology are sobering, the implications for political theory seem all the more acute. Bourdieu argued that people are driven by a “logical conformism” and a “moral conformism”²⁹ to reach “an immediate, prereflexive consensus on the meaning of the world, which is the basis of the experience of the world as the ‘common-sense’ world.” It immediately follows, argued Bourdieu, that “the theory of knowledge of the social world is a fundamental dimension of political theory” because this ‘common-sense’ is itself politically determined (1997:173).³⁰ We are thus conformists in spite of ourselves, and the real determinants of our conformity lie beyond the ballot box or the political meeting in a shadow world of symbolic power, rendering (as we have seen) any activism or political activity not so much pointless as misdirected, aimed at the purely formal levers of power, by which we can never obtain the change we

endowed with the properties included in the dominant definition of politics, ignores the fact that the practical mastery expressed in everyday choices (which may or may not be capable of being constituted as political in terms of the dominant definition) is based not on the explicit principles of an ever vigilant, universally competent consciousness, but on the implicit schemes of thought and action of a class habitus...a class unconscious rather than a class consciousness” (1984:418-419).

²⁸“By offering a choice among several utterances and asking for a position to be taken on the already-uttered, the survey...proceeds as if it had already resolved the essential problem of politics, namely, the question of the transmutation of experience into discourse, of the unformulated ethos into a constituted, constituting logos, of a class sense” (1984:460).

²⁹For the origins of these terms, see Durkheim 1912.

³⁰“In order for symbolic domination to be set up, the dominated have to share with the dominant the schemes of perception and appreciation through which they are perceived by them and through which they perceive them; they have to see themselves as they are seen. In other words, their knowledge and recognition have to be rooted in practical dispositions of acceptance and submission, which, because they do not pass through deliberation and decision, escape the dilemma of consent or constraint” (1997:198).

seek.

It would seem that Bourdieu has undone the naturalizing of judgment only too well. Not only is taste not objective, it is a pernicious, subjective servant of the powerful, conspiring to keep us in our place through our own unconscious complicity. Bourdieu would no doubt hold out the weak hope that we can at least discover our own socializations and attempt to ‘deprogram’ ourselves. But we can take a more encouraging line by noticing that the picture of “structuring beings who structure” opens up powerful new avenues of research. Recent work has argued that Bourdieu’s process may not be as coherent as he supposed, in the sense that multiple “orders of worth” (or symbolic orders) may exist at the same time (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). The crosscutting of the symbolic orders characteristic of the modern world could insulate us from the deterministic fate that Bourdieu foresaw, as the intersection of these spheres of value (Walzer 1983) seems likely to provide us with opportunities to link issues and take actions in one sphere that affect another (see Putnam 1988). This proliferation of strategic possibilities is contingent on the conscious understanding of symbolic power, requiring precisely the sort of conscious “deprogramming” Bourdieu would advocate.

While the interaction of symbolic orders provides a conscious citizen of a modern liberal democracy with a scope of possibility that Bourdieu’s subjects in 1960s France could not have imagined, we can interpret this possibility as a mere increase in the attractiveness of the exit option (Hirschman 1970), induced by the presence of complementary and competing symbolic orders or “orders of worth”. This should have two implications for existing symbolic orders. As Bourdieu repeatedly points out, the exercise of symbolic power is dependent on the tacit, unconscious consent of the dominated classes. It seems an open question whether we should expect newly-awakened dominated classes to fight for a new symbolic order if

they have the option to simply reinterpret their life according to a distinct order of worth. In other words, the proliferation of spheres of value may undermine our incentive to fight for any of them. This appears to be a substantial point of difference between Walzer and Bourdieu – while Walzer joins Madison and Machiavelli in seeing a multiplicity of spheres of value as a source of political stability, Bourdieu seems to think that incommensurability (across fields) is a source of domination. As he only accepted the existence of one symbolic order at a time, it is difficult to decide just what he would have made of arguments involving more than one such order, but it is easy to imagine him making a similar claim: that the impossibility of translating capital from one social order to another provides an incentive to (tacitly) accede to domination.

It is tempting to wave one's hands and declare that structuring beings who structure will find a way around all this. Indeed, all it may take is a tacit shift from a "logic of appropriateness" to a "logic of consequences" where behavior that had been heretofore reflexive and non-calculating is explicitly rationalized (Fearon and Wendt 2002). But this process cannot be applied to all of social life. Our best hope may be that by proliferating symbolic orders, we democratize access to the dominant class. A human nature that can transcend symbolic power seems remote, but a cultivated distaste for the idea of domination, combined with a ruthless process of uncovering and highlighting tacit domination, may provide the best corrective to our apparently unconscious and ineradicable tendency to dominate one another.

SYMBOLIC INSTRUMENTS

as STRUCTURING STRUCTURES	as STRUCTURED STRUCTURES	as INSTRUMENTS OF DOMINATION
instruments for knowledge and construction of objective world	means of communication (language/culture vs. speech/ behaviour)	power division of labour (social classes) division of ideological labour (mental/manual) domination function
<u>Symbolic forms</u>	<u>Symbolic objects</u>	<u>Ideologies</u>
subjective structures (modus operandi)	objective structures (opus operatum)	(vs. myths, languages)
KANT - CASSIRER	HEGEL - SAUSSURE	MARX
SAPIR-WHORF-DURKHEIM-LEVI-STRAUSS (culturalism) MAUSS (semiology)	Social Forms of classification	Bodies of specialists competing for monopoly of legitimate symbolic production WEBER
Signification: objectivity as agreement of subjects (consensus)	Signification: objectivity as product of communication that is condition of communication	
sociology of symbolic forms		
contribution of symbolic power to gnoseological order		
= meaning = consensus i.e. <u>doxa</u>		
orthodoxy		
Ideological power as specific contribution of symbolic violence (inculcation of <u>habitus</u>) to political violence (domination)		

Bourdieu's taxonomy of misunderstandings: how symbolic instruments have been understood (1977:113).

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